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I. INTRODUCTION
The first commercial radio station in the
United States aired its initial broadcast from Pitts-
burgh, Pennsylvania in the Fall of 1920.1 Since
those early days of radio, broadcasters have not
been liable to record companies for the public
transmission of copyrighted sound recordings
aired as part of their programming. There are two
primary reasons why radio broadcasters have been
able to escape liability. First, the right to the pub-
lic performance of sound recordings did not exist
until 1971.2 Second, when Congress finally recog-
nized an exclusive right in the public perform-
ance of sound recordings in 1995, it limited that
right to the public performance of sound record-
ings by means of a digital transmission. The newly-
created liability was mainly for Internet-based in-
teractive subscription services and did not affect
FCC-licensed radio stations. 3
By 1998, Congress had broadened the exclusive
right in sound recording to include protection
against illegal transmission by certain non-interac-
tive nonsubscription services, known as "webcas-
ters," because a large number of FCC-licensed ra-
* I would like to thank Ben Ivins, Senior Associate Gen-
eral Counsel at the National Association of Broadcasters, for
his comments and guidance. All errors are my own.
I Barry Mishkind, The First Hundred Stations in the United
States, at http://oldradio.com/archives/general/firstl00.
html, (last visited Nov. 12, 2001) (listing KDKA's transmis-
sion on Oct. 27, 1920 as the first radio broadcast); see also
KDKA RADIO, at http://trfn.clpgh.org/nmb/nmbkdka.
htm, (last visited Nov. 18, 2001) (reporting that the first
broadcast of KDKA radio by Harry P. Davis, a Vice President
of Westinghouse Electric, is considered the start of the
broadcasting industry).
2 Joshua D. Levine, Dancing to a New Tune, A Digital One:
The Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, 20
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 624, 630 (1996) [hereinafter Levine].
3 Jeffery A. Abrahamson, Tuning Up for a New Musical Age:
Sound Recording Copyright Protection in a Digital Environment, 25
dio stations had begun streaming their signals
through the Internet. 4 Between 1998 and 2000, it
was unclear whether the new legislation concern-
ing digital transmissions extended to FCC-li-
censed AM/FM radio stations that streamed their
own signals over the Internet rather than through
third party webcasters.5
A recent ruling by the Copyright Office ("Of-
fice") has determined that AM/FM radio stations
that want to simultaneously stream their broad-
cast signals through the Internet will be liable to
record companies for the public performance of
copyrighted sound recordings unless they comply
with certain programming and technical require-
ments and apply for a license.6 Compliance with
the Copyright Office's licensing requirements
could cost radio stations millions of dollars in ad-
ditional expenses and annual royalties to record
companies.
This Note examines the copyright debate over
the simultaneous streaming of broadcast signals
by FCC-licensed AM/FM radio stations through
the Internet. Part I examines the "streaming"
technology and its significance in the context of
AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS'N Q.J. 181, 205-206 (1997) [herein-
after Abrahamson].
4 See David J. Wittenstein & M. Lorrane Ford, The Webcast-
ing Wars, J. INTERNET LAw, Feb. 1999, available at http://
www.gcwf.com/articles/journal/jil-feb99_2.html (last visited
Sep. 8, 2001) [hereinafter Wittenstein & Ford]. See alsoJerry
S. Birenz, Internet Publishing: The Legal and Business Issues as
Traditional Publishing Moves to Electronic Media- Webcasting Mu-
sic, 601 PRAc. L. INST. PAT. COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS & LITER-
ARY PROP. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 209, 220-221 (2000)
[hereinafter Birenz] (discussing the status of eligible non-in-
teractive nonsubscription transmissions under the DMCA).
5 Id. at 224.
6 Public Performance of Sound Recordings: Definition of
a Service, 65 Fed. Reg. 77,292 (Dec. 11, 2000) (to be codified
at 37 C.F.R. § 201.35).
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the copyright liability of FCC-licensed radio
broadcasters. Part II presents a brief overview of
the history and evolution of the right of public
performance of sound recordings and, more spe-
cifically, the evolution of Section 114 of the Copy-
right Act as amended in 1995 and 1998. Part II
will also discuss the Copyright Office's final ruling
and the effect of the new law on the applicability
of Sections 106 and 112 of the Copyright Act to
FCC-licensed AM/FM radio stations seeking to si-
multaneously stream their broadcast signals over
the air and through the Internet.
Part III examines the United States District
Court's opinion in Bonneville v. Register of Copy-
rights, where radio broadcasters and the National
Association of Broadcasters ("NAB") challenged
the Copyright Office's authority to rule on the lia-
bility of broadcasters. Part III discusses the ratio-
nale behind the Copyright Office's rulemaking,
specifically, whether it adequately balances Con-
gress' intent to safeguard record producers from
illegal copying, while preserving the traditionally
symbiotic relationship between radio broadcasters
and the recording industry. Part III also applies
the Bonneville analysis and the parties' arguments
to conclude that the Copyright Office's recent
rulemaking is not solely motivated by the Record-
ing Industry Association of America's ("RIAA")
fear of declining sales, but that it is also a long
awaited opportunity for the Office to subject FCC-
licensed radio stations to copyright liability for the
public performance of sound recordings. Part IV
discusses the options available to radio stations
under the new law, should they lose their appeal
in the Bonneville case.
II. HOW STREAMING WORKS
Radio stations use a process called "streaming"
to broadcast their signals over the Internet.7 This
process was pioneered by RealNetworks, who de-
veloped "Real Audio," a file format used to trans-
mit audio files through the Internet. 8 Streaming
involves the creation of a temporary file on the
user's hard drive that "buffers" the sound and
plays it on the user's computer without having to
download the entire file.9 Buffering refers to a
process by which the file enters the user's com-
puter and is saved as memory, or "cache," on the
user's hard drive before being streamed. The
RealPlayer software on the user's computer con-
tacts a "RealServer" that sends the audio file to
the end-user's computer at his or her request:' 0
RealPlayer is able to read the file stream as it
comes in and transmits it as a smooth stream of
sound without causing the user to download the
entire file onto the hard drive."1
In the case of a radio broadcast, the end-user
has no control over the selection of music or the
sequencing of songs, nor can he or she replay the
song or save it on the computer's hard drive. This
process is very much like listening to an old-fash-
ioned radio. 12 Instead of turning on the radio, the
listener can simply click on a link to listen to an
ongoing broadcast program. The computer, using
a decoder or "plug-in," converts the digital infor-
mation contained in the RealAudio files into
sound waves, i.e., analog information, so that the
end-user can listen to it.13
Using this process, FCC-licensed radio stations
can retransmit their own signals over the Internet
7 Charles Lozow and Neil Rosini, Music, the Internet and
New Media: Special Problems, in 505 PRAc. L. INST. PAT. COPy-
RIGHTS, TRADEMARKS & LITERARY PROP. COURSE HANDBOOK SE-
RIES 637, 640-641 (1998) [hereinafter Lozow & Rosini].
8 REALNETWORKS, DIGITAL MEDIA GLOSSARY, at http://
realnetworks.com/glossary.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2001)
[hereinafter GLOSSARY].
9 Martha F. Phelps, Complying with Requirements for a Statu-
tory License in Sound Recordings Under the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act of 1998, 45 B. B.J. 6, 6 (2001) [hereinafter
Phelps] (commenting, "the streaming of live audio involves
the transmission of 'a continuous 'stream' of data that is tem-
porarily stored ('buffered') in the listener's computer, and
converted into audio signals by music 'player' software).
10 REAL NETWORKS, REALPLAYER 8 PLUS USER MANUAL
CHAPTER 6: WHAT IS STRFAMINC. MFFIA ANn How DnlFs IT
WORK?, at http://service.real.com/help/player/
plus-manual.8/rppmanual.htm (last visited Dec. 22, 2001)
[hereinafter REALPLAYER MANUAL] (instructing that when the
user clicks on an audio link, the RealPlayer software on the
user's computer sends a small pointer file that contains the
name and the location of the requested audio clip on the
RealServer. Next, the user's "RealPlayer contacts the Real-
Server which sends the actual stream and stays in contact
with Real Server" while the file is playing, allowing the user to
manipulate the file by fast-forwarding or rewinding the clip.
In the case of live broadcasts, "RealPlayer speaks directly to
the RealServer without the need for the earlier pointer
file.").
I I See id.
12 See Losow & Rosini, supra note 7, at 640-641.
13 REALPIAYER MANUAL, supra note 10.
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without having to create a separate webcast pro-
gram. 14 However, the Office considers the crea-
tion of temporary files on a user's hard drive,
which is necessitated by the streaming process, an
infringement of both the sound recording and
the performance rights of copyright owners.
Thus, the Office amended Section 114 of the
Copyright Act, 15 which requires webcasters to ob-
tain a statutory license, as well as the ephemeral
recording provisions of Section 112.16
III. AN OVERVIEW OF THE PUBLIC
PERFORMANCE RIGHT IN SOUND
RECORDINGS
A. Separate Rights for Record Companies:
History of Performance Rights in Sound
Recordings
The Supreme Court first recognized the right
in sound recording as separate from the right to
the underlying musical work in White-Smith Music
Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co. 1 7 In White-Smith, the
Court held that the perforated rolls used to
reproduce the sounds of a musical work in
mechanical piano players are separate from the
underlying copyrighted musical composition and
do not infringe on the right to the musical com-
position they reproduce.1 8 The Copyright Act of
1909 did not refer to sound recordings because,
at the time of the Act, only tangible copies such as
14 See Birenz, supra note 4, at 224.
15 17 U.S.C. §114(d) (2) (C) (2000).
16 Id. §112.
17 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
18 Id. at 10, 13 (citing Boosey v. Whight, 1 Ch. 122
(1900)).
The plaintiffs are entitled to copyright in three sheets of
music. What does this mean? It means that they have the
exclusive right of printing or otherwise multiplying cop-
ies of those sheets of music, i.e., if the bars, notes, and
other printed words and signs on those sheets. But plain-
tiffs have no exclusive right to the production of the
sounds indicated by or on those sheets of music; nor to
the performance in private of the music indicated by
such sheets; nor to any mechanism for the production of
such sounds or music.
Id. at 13.
19 Id. at 11.
20 Stephanie Haun, Musical Works Performance and the In-
ternet: A Discorance of Old and New Copyright Rules, 6 RICH. J.L.
& TECH. 3, 8 (1999) [hereinafter Haun] (discussing the in-
troduction of a "for-profit" requirement as a condition for
protection of performance right for musical works, but not
for sound recordings, where the music user charged an ad-
mission fee for the performance).
written sheets of music were protected, not the
sound recording of a musical performance. Ac-
cording to Justice William Rufus Day, "only the
tangible thing is dealt with by the law, and its mul-
tiplication or reproduction is all that is protected
by the statute."19
The Copyright Act of 1909 protected only "for-
profit" public performances of a musical work.20
More than sixty years later, Congress extended
copyright protection to sound recordings by pass-
ing the Sound Recordings Act of 1971.21 How-
ever, this Act was primarily intended to protect re-
cord companies from the illegal copying of tapes
and records, and did not cover the exclusive right
to public performance of sound recordings. 22 De-
spite the recording industry's effort to have an ex-
clusive right of public performance of sound re-
cordings recognized for copyright owners, the
1976 Act retained the same provisions as the 1971
Act.2 3 The 1976 Act protected the record compa-
nies against illegal duplication of records and
tapes but still did not recognize an exclusive right
to the public performance of these recordings. 24
Under the 1971 and 1976 Acts, FCC-licensed ra-
dio stations were required to pay royalties to com-
posers and publishers in exchange for the right to
perform the copyrighted works on the radio. But
the Act did not recognize a comparable right of
public performance for the radio broadcast of
sound recordings. 25 Consequently, radio stations
21 See Rebecca F. Martin, The Digital Performance Right in
Sound Recordings Act of 1995: Can It Protect U.S. Sound Recording
Copyright Owners in a Global Market?, 14 CARDozo ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 733, 736 (1996) [hereinafter Martin].
22 Id. at 737 (explaining that the 1971 Act extended cop-
yright protection to sound recordings, but only to protect
against illegal reproduction of phonorecords and tapes).
23 Id. at 737-39 (discussing the Copyright Office's and
the recording industry's recommendations that Congress in-
clude a public performance right in the early drafts of the
1976 Act, although they did not make it into the final version
of the Act).
24 17 U.S.C. §114(a) (2000).
25 Before 1995, the Act protected copyrighted material
being performed in public only if the performance was for
profit, e.g., if the establishment charged an admission fee.
Public performance in public places such as hotels or stores
was exempted by statute if the establishment used "an appa-
ratus of a kind commonly used in private homes." For pur-
poses of determining the statutory exemption, the court
would only consider the type of apparatus used and not the
size of the establishment itself; see, e.g., Cass County Music
Co. v. Muedini, 821 F. Supp. 1278 (E.D. Wis., 1993); Edison
Bros. Stores, Inc. v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 954 F. 2d 1419 (81h
Cir. 1992).
20031
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
did not infringe upon public performance copy-
rights during a broadcast. 26
As new technological advances challenge the
boundaries of copyright law, the need for new leg-
islation has become apparent. Digitization of in-
formation is the latest challenge to the traditional
notions of copyright law. In 1994, pursuant to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT"), Congress added a new Chapter 11 to
the Copyright Act. This Chapter prohibits the un-
authorized fixation of "sounds or sounds and
images of a live musical performance in a copy or
phonorecord," as well as the transmission or com-
munication to the public of "sounds or sounds
and images of a live musical performance."2 7
One year later, Congress enacted the Digital
Performance Right in the Sound Recordings Act
of 1995 ("DPRA"). 28 For the first time since the
1976 Act, the DPRA granted record companies an
exclusive right in the public performance of their
sound recordings "by means of a digital audio
transmission." 29 Congress added a new subsection
to Section 106 of the Copyright Act that recog-
nized an exclusive right in the digital perform-
ance of a copyrighted sound recording.30 Protec-
tion against illegal transmissions by interactive or
on-demand Internet services, such as Napster, mo-
tivated the creation of this exclusive right.31 The
DPRA, however, did not extend the exclusive
26 17 U.S.C. §114(c) (1976). Section 114 of the Copy-
right Act of 1976 defined the scope of exclusive rights in
sound recordings and specified, under subsection (c), that it
"does not limit or impair the exclusive right to perform pub-
licly, by means of a phonorecord, any of the works specified
by section 106(4)." Id.
27 17 U.S.C. §§1101(a)(1)-(2) (2000).
28 Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of
1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (1995) [hereinafter
DPRA].
29 Id.; see also MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPY-
RIGHT LAW 10 (3d ed. 1999) (discussing the exclusive rights
of copyright ownership tinder the 1976 Act) [hereinafter
LEAFFER].
30 17 U.S.C. §106(6) (2000); see also Steven J. Pena, Li-
censing Music for Use on the Internet, 662 PLI 525, 528 (2001)
[hereinafter Pena] (explaining that songwriters and music
publishers negotiate their copyright license fees through the
Harry Fox Agency, while public performance rights are nego-
tiated through performing rights societies such as ASCAP,
BMI and SESAC); see also Phelps, supra note 9, at 19 (explain-
ing that webcasters will have to pay the statutory license fees
directly to RIAA).
31 Bonneville Int'l Corp. v. Marybeth Peters, as Register
of Copyrights, 153 F. Supp. 2d 763, 767 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 1,
2001).
32 Summary, United States Copyright Office, The Digital
right's coverage to analog or digital radio broad-
casts. More importantly, it was silent as to the sta-
tus of radio stations that stream their broadcast
signals simultaneously through the Internet.3 2
Legislative history reveals that broadcasters
were in favor of the DPRA because it did not im-
pose liability on FCC-licensed radio stations and
because it targeted Internet-based digital audio
subscription services that could potentially com-
pete with commercial radio stations.33 In addition
to exclusive rights, the DPRA created four catego-
ries of transmissions that were subject to a com-
pulsory license. One such category encompassed
certain audio transmissions by subscription ser-
vices. 3 4
Finally, in 1998, Congress enacted the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA"), amending
Section 114 of the Copyright Act to exempt cer-
tain transmissions from the exclusive public per-
formance rights in sound recordings found in
Section 106. 3  The DMCA resulted from negotia-
tions between webcasters and the Recording In-
dustry Association of America ("RIAA"). It specifi-
cally addressed webcasting activities on the In-
ternet 36 and subjected certain non-interactive,
non-subscription digital transmissions of sound
recordings over the Internet to statutory licens-
ing.37
Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, U.S. Copyright Office
Summary at 15 (December 1998). Under the DPRA, the
newly created right to performance right in sound record-
ings was limited to the digital transmission of those sounds.
33 See LEAFFER, supra note 29, at 355.
34 Id. at 11 (discussing the four compulsory licenses
under the 1976 Act).
35 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No.
105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. §§106, 112, 114 (1998)) [hereinafter DMCA]; see also
LEAFFER, supra note 29, at 14-15 (explaining that the DMCA
was designed to implement two international digital treaties,
the World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") Cop-
yright Treaty and the WIPO Performers and Phonograms
Treaty).
36 See Honorable Marybeth Peters, Register of Copy-
rights, Statement of the Register of Copyrights before the Subcommit-
tee on Courts and Intellectual Property Committee on Judiciary
United State House of Representatives at http://www.lcweb.loc.
gov/copyright/docs/regstat6l5OO.html (last visited June 15,
2000) [hereinafter Peters].
37 DMCA §402. The DMCA did not envision displacing
the exemption for original transmissions made by an FCC-
licensed broadcaster. The new Section 112 permitted trans-
mitting entities other than broadcasters to make ephemeral
copies of sound recordings for the transmissions originating
on the Internet.
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B. The Status of AM/FM Radio Broadcasters
Under Section 114.
Under Section 114 of the Copyright Act,38 all
AM and FM radio stations licensed by the FCC are
exempt from paying a licensing fee to record
companies for the public performance of sound
recordings involved in broadcasting. 39 On Decem-
ber 11, 2000, the Copyright Office ruled that FCC-
licensed radio stations that simultaneously stream
their broadcast signals over the Internet are not
exempt from copyright liability under Section
114(d)(1)(A).4 0 Section 114 provides that the
public performance of a sound recording is ex-
empt from copyright if is "part of a nonsubscrip-
tion transmission other than a retransmission.."4 1
The ruling came after a period of uncertainty re-
garding the DMCA's position on the exemption
status of traditional radio stations that simultane-
ously stream their signals through the Internet
and the reach of Section 114 as amended.
In most cases, a sound recording is copyrighted
separately from the underlying musical work.
However, even under the new law, radio stations
do not pay a licensing fee to record companies for
the public performance of sound recordings. This
is arguably because record companies receive free
advertising when the recorded songs are played
on the radio.42 Thus, FCC-licensed radio stations
that transmit their broadcast signals through a
"terrestrial" antenna do not infringe copyrights.
Until the Office's December ruling, it was unclear
38 17 U.S.C. §114 (2000).
39 See Ronald H. Gertz, Radio to Pay for Internet Streaming,
640 PLI/PAT 63, 65 (2001). "These royalties are over and
above the fees that radio stations pay to ASCAP [the Ameri-
can Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers], BMI
[Broadcast Music Inc.] and the SESAC [Society of European
State Authors and Composers] for the fight to perform musi-
cal compositions." Id.
40 See Public Performance of Sound Recordings, 65 Fed.
Reg. at 77,292.
41 17 U.S.C. §114(d)(1)(A) (2000).
42 See generally, Wittenstein & Ford, supra note 4.
43 See generally Phelps, supra note 9, at 20; see also Birenz,
supra note 4, at 224 (explaining that the DMCA contains a
provision addressing the application of statutory fees to web-
casters). However, until recently, it had been unclear
whether this provision applied to radio stations that retrans-
mitted their own signals over the Internet. Id.
44 Peters, supra note 36 ("Section 114 of the Copyright
Act was amended by expanding the compulsory license for
the performance fight to sound recording to include 'eligi-
ble nonsubscription services' (i.e., webcasters), and Section
112 was amended to address the reproduction rights.").
45 Bonneville Int'l Corp., 153 F. Supp. 2d at 770. "[O]n
whether FCC-licensed radio stations remained ex-
empt when they simultaneously streamed their
signals through the Internet. 43 The legislative his-
tory of the ruling suggests that when the DMCA
added a category of "eligible nonsubscription ser-
vices," it only referred to webcasters and excluded
FCC-licensed broadcasters. 44 To clarify this, the
RIAA petitioned the Copyright Office on March
1, 2000, to rule that traditional FCC-licensed radio
stations that simultaneously stream their broad-
cast signals through the Internet are not exempt
from licensing fees. 45
In comments submitted to the Copyright Office
in connection with the petition, broadcasters ar-
gued that under Section 114, FCC-licensed AM/
FM radio stations that stream their own signals
through the Internet are still considered to be en-
gaging in a "nonsubscription broadcast transmis-
sion" 46 and, under the Copyright Act, are not lia-
ble to record companies for performance rights. 47
The RIAA, on the other hand, noted that the
Copyright Office defines "transmission" as a ter-
restrial broadcast by an FCC-licensed radio sta-
tion,48 within a 150-mile radius of a terrestrial an-
tenna, which by definition cannot include In-
ternet broadcasts. 49 In its final ruling, the Office
determined that simultaneous Internet broadcasts
are not exempt from copyright liability under Sec-
tion 114 because the Internet reaches listeners all
over the world, and thus, beyond the 150-mile ra-
dius. Therefore, the Copyright Office ruled that
March 1, 2000, RIAA petitioned the Copyright Office for a
Rulemaking to clarify whether AM/FM broadcasters who si-
multaneously stream their broadcasts over the Internet could
claim the section 114 (d) (1) (A) exemption to the public per-
formance right of section 106." Id.
46 17 U.S.C. §114(d)(1)(A) (2000).
47 Bonneville Int'l Corp., 135 F. Supp. 2d at 772. ("Many
broadcasters, and the NAB, have stayed out of the CARP pro-
ceedings on the grounds that they qualify for the section
114(d) (1) (A) exemption."). See also Plaintiffs' Memorandum
of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motions to Dismiss or
For Summary Judgment and in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion
For Summary Judgment at 11, Bonneville v. Peters, 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 10919 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 2001) (No. 01-0408)
("Entities, not transmissions, hold FCC licenses").
48 17 U.S.C. §114(j) (3) (2000) (defining a 'broadcast' as
"a transmission made by a terrestrial broadcast station li-
censed as such by the Federal Communications Commis-
sion").
49 17 U.S.C. §114(d) (1) (B) (i) (2000) (explaining, "radio
stations' broadcast transmission is not willfully or repeatedly
retransmitted more than a radius of 150 miles from the site
of the radio broadcast transmitter .... ").
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such web broadcasters cannot benefit from the
exemption accorded to their over-the-air counter-
parts under Section 114.50
Bonneville International Corp. v. Register of Copy-
rights was decided on August 1, 2001.5 1 The plain-
tiffs, radio station owners and operators, as well as
the National Association of Broadcasters ("NAB"),
asked the court to review the Copyright Office's
ruling. Plaintiffs challenged the Office's statutory
authority to issue a ruling that interpreted Section
114 in the absence of explicit language in the stat-
ute or the DMCA.52 Ultimately, the court held
that the Copyright Office has the authority to is-
sue the ruling and that the ruling was reasonable
and consistent with the statute's legislative his-
tory.53 The Bonneville decision is inconsistent with
the legislative histories of the DRPA and the
DMCA, which clearly reveal Congress' intent to
preserve the traditional relationship between
broadcasters and the recording industry.
C. The Public Performance Rights in the
Digital Age: The DPRA
Congress enacted the DPRA to protect record
companies against the unauthorized digital trans-
mission and copying of sound recordings. It did
not change the status of other exempt public per-
formances of digital recordings, including radio
broadcasts and compact discs. 54 The DPRA added
a new subsection to Section 106, providing re-
cording companies with the exclusive right to
"perform the copyrighted work publicly by means
of a digital audio transmission.' 55 For the first time,
the record companies's exclusive rights to the
public performance of their recordings, albeit a
limited one, was recognized. 56 The DPRA also
50 Bonneville Int'l Coip., 153 F. Supp. 2d at 776. "Section
114(d) (1) (B) allows for the retransmission of over-the-air
broadcasts if the retransmission remains within 150 miles of
the site of the original radio broadcast transmitter. Id.
51 Id. at 763.
52 Id. at 771 (citing NAB's Memorandum in Opposition
to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or for SummaryJudgment)
("Plaintiffs argue that the Copyright Office lacks the power
to determine whether AM/FM streamers are exempt from
the section 106 public performance right by section
114(d) (1)(A) because Congress opted not to vest the agency
with that authority.").
53 Id. at 72 ("The legislative history also points out to
congressional intent to use the Copyright Office as an inter-
preter of copyright law.").
54 139 CONG. Rec. S10897 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1993) (state-
ment of Sen. Hatch) [hereinafter Hatch].
modified Section 114(d)(1) to provide that a
"nonsubscription broadcast transmission"'' 5 of a
musical performance "is not an infringement of
the Section 106" exclusive performance right.58
Thus, under Section 114, Congress exempted
all analog and digital transmissions by FCC-li-
censed radio stations from copyright liability for
the public performance of sound recordings. 59
The exemption applied to a "nonsubscription
broadcast transmission," as well as to a "retrans-
mission of a nonsubscription transmission," pro-
vided that it is within a 150-mile radius of the ra-
dio transmitter, and to a "nonsubscription broad-
cast transmission by a radio station licensed by the
FCC [when] retransmitted on a nonsubscription
basis by a terrestrial broadcast station, terrestrial
translator, or translator repeater licensed by the
FCC."60 Under the DPRA, FCC-licensed radio sta-
tions remained exempt from liability even if a ra-
dio station converted from analog to digital trans-
mission.61 Although the DPRA granted exclusive
public performance rights to owners of sound re-
cordings that are transmitted digitally, it also ex-
empted FCC-licensed radio stations regardless of
whether they broadcasted through an antenna or
streamed their signal using digital technology. 62
In addition to the Section 114 exemptions, Sec-
tion 112 of the Copyright Act exempts the crea-
tion of one ephemeral copy of a sound recording
for the purpose of transmitting the sound record-
ing to the public.63 It is not a copyright infringe-
ment if the transmitting organization makes "no
more than one copy" of the copyrighted sound re-
cording and uses it as part of a radio broadcast or
a public performance transmitted under license
from the copyright owner. In the case of broad-
casters, the copy must be used by the radio station
55 17 U.S.C. §106(6) (2000) (emphasis added).
56 Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of
1995, S. 227, 104th Congress, §2 (1995).
57 17 U.S.C. §114(d)(1)(A) (2000).
58 Id. §114(d) (1).
59 See id.
60 17 U.S.C. §1 14(d) (1) (B) (i) (1) (2000).
61 Id. §114(d)(1)(A). Analog transmissions are not af-
fected by the new Section 114 and remain exempt. In addi-
tion, Section 114 exempts digital audio transmissions, if the
performance is part of a "nonsubscription broadcast trans-
mission." Id.
62 Id.; §114(d)(1)(B)(i)(I). The Section 114 exemption
for broadcast transmissions is further limited to a "terrestrial
broadcast station . . . licensed by the Federal Communica-
tions Commission." Id.
63 17 U.S.C. §112(a)(1) (2000).
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for transmissions within its local service area. 64
Therefore, the DPRA did not change the scope
of sound recording liability as applied to FCC-li-
censed AM/FM radio broadcasters. 65 The DMCA
was enacted three years later to redefine the
scope of Section 114 and to bring webcasters
within the reach of the statutory license scheme
previously applied to cable and satellite transmis-
sions. 66
D. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of
1998: ("The DMCA")
Three years later, when Congress enacted the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, it re-
vised Section 114 to add programming and tech-
nological requirements for all Internet-based ra-
dio transmissions that were eligible for a statutory
license. 67 In recognition of the performance
rights of recording companies, and in a continu-
ing effort to defeat illegal downloading of musical
works from the Internet, the DMCA set forth a list
64 Id.
65 See Levine, supra note 2, at 645-646 (focusing on the
effect of DRPA on radio broadcasting).
66 See Peters, supra note 36, at 1 (discussing the appropri-
ateness of subjecting radio and television Internet streaming
to compulsory licensing).
67 See Wittenstein & Ford, supra note.
68 17 U.S.C. §114(j) (13) (2000):
The 'sound recording performance complement' is the
transmission during any 3-hour period, on a particular
channel used by a transmitting entity, of no more
than-
(A) 3 different selections of sound recordings from
any one phonorecord lawfully distributed for public per-
formance or sale in the United States, if no more than 2
such selections are transmitted consecutively; or
(B) 4 different selections of sound recordings-
(i) by the same featured recording artist; or
(ii) from any set or compilation of phonorecords
lawfully distributed together as a unit for public per-
formance or sale in the United States, if no more than
three such selections are transmitted consecutively: Pro-
vided, That the transmission of selections in excess of
the numerical limits provided for in clauses (A) and (B)
from multiple phonorecords shall nonetheless qualify as
a sound recording performance complement if the pro-
gramming of the multiple phonorecords was not will-
fully intended to avoid the numerical limitations pre-
scribed in such clauses.
69 See id.
70 17 U.S.C. §114(d) (2) (C) (viii) (2000):
The transmitting entity accommodates and does not in-
terfere with the transmission of technical measures that
are widely used by sound recording copyright owners to
identify or protect copyrighted works, and that are tech-
nically feasible of being transmitted by the transmitting
entity without imposing substantial costs on the transmit-
of play restrictions, referred to as the "sound re-
cording performance complement. '6 Webcasters
have to comply with the performance comple-
ment in order to be eligible for compulsory licens-
ing under the Act.69 In addition, webcasters must
implement technological safety measures to pre-
vent users from defeating the site's anti-piracy
measures.
70
The compulsory licensing process is more effi-
cient for webcasters because they can negotiate
blanket license fees through the RIAA rather than
with each copyright owner.71 The statutory license
applies only to webcasters since, under Section
114, the transmission may not be part of an inter-
active service. 72 Under the terms of the license,
the transmission must be accompanied by infor-
mation identifying the sound recording's title and
the featured artist's name.73 Also, the sound re-
cording must not exceed the sound recording
complement.7 4 In addition, webcasters may not,
by way of advance program schedules, make the
contents of the program known to the listeners. 75
ting entity or resulting in perceptible aural or visual deg-
radation of the digital signal, except that the require-
ment of this clause shall not apply to a satellite digital
audio service that is in operation, or that is licensed
under the authority of the Federal Communications
Commission, on or before July 31, 1998, to the extent
that such service has designed, developed, or made com-
mitments to procure equipment or technology that is
not compatible with such technical measures before
such technical measures are widely adopted by sound re-
cording copyright owners.
71 See INTERNATIONAL WEBCASTING ASSOCIATION, DMCA:
MORE Music LICENSING ROYALTIES FOR WEBCASTERS, at http:/
/www.webcasters.org/legal. (last visited Sep. 8, 2001). [here-
inafter IWA].
72 17 U.S.C. §114(d) (2) (A) (i) (2000).
73 17 U.S.C. §114(d)(2)(A)(iii) (2000):
[Except] as provided in section 1002(e), the transmis-
sion of the sound recording is accompanied, if techni-
cally feasible, by the information encoded in that sound
recording, if any, by or under the authority of the copy-
right owner of that sound recording, that identifies the
title of the sound recording, the featured recording art-
ist who performs on the sound recording, and related
information, including information concerning the un-
derlying musical work and its writer.
74 17 U.S.C. §114(d)(2)(B)(i) (2000); see also id. §114
(d) (2) (stating that the "complement" refers to the number
of songs from the same album, or the same recording artist,
that can be played back to back or within a specified time
period).
75 17 U.S.C. §114(d) (2) (C) (ii) (2000):
(ii) [Tihe transmitting entity does not cause to be pub-
lished, or induce or facilitate the publication, by means
of an advance program schedule or prior announce-
ment, the titles of the specific sound recordings to be
transmitted, the phonorecords embodying such sound
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Further, webcasters must limit their use of prede-
termined and archived programming, thereby al-
lowing listeners to determine at what time a par-
ticular song is played. 76 Webcasters must comply
with the DMCA's technological requirements to
prevent automatic channel switching and scan-
ning of songs by end-users. 77 Finally, webcasters
must implement technological devices to prevent
listeners from illegally downloading songs. 78
Some webcasters are presumably in the process of
negotiating licensing fees.79 If the parties fail to
reach an agreement, however, the matter will be
referred to a Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel
("CARP"), which will determine the licensing fee
for each radio station.8 0
In addition to Section 114, the Office updated
Section 112 of the Copyright Act 8l to conform to
the DMCA. Under Section 112, FCC-licensed ra-
dio stations are authorized to make a single
ephemeral copy of a sound recording to be used
in broadcasting to their "local service area."8 2 The
recording industry and the broadcasters, however,
do not agree on the meaning of "local service
area." Record companies argue that broadcasters'
local service area under the DMCA is limited to a
150-mile radius from the broadcast antenna or
from the retransmitter antenna.8 3 Broadcasters,
however, argue that for FCC-licensed radio sta-
tions that stream over the Internet the "local ser-
vice area" is global in scope.8 4
Under the terms of the statutory license, web-
casters are also exempt from liability under Sec-
recordings, or, other than for illustrative purposes, the
names of the featured recording artists, except that this
clause does not disqualify a transmitting entity that
makes a prior announcement that a particular artist will
be featured within an unspecified future time period,
and in the case of a retransmission of a broadcast trans-
mission by a transmitting entity that does not have the
right or ability to control the programming of the broad-
cast transmission, the requirement of this clause shall
not apply to a prior oral announcement by the broadcast
station, or to an advance program schedule published,
induced, or facilitated by the broadcast station, if the
transmitting entity does not have actual knowledge and
has not received written notice from the copyright
owner or its representative that the broadcast station
publishes or induces or facilitates the publication of
such advance program schedule, or if such advance pro-
gram schedule is a schedule of classical music program-
ming published by the broadcast station in the same
manner as published by that broadcast station on or
before September 30, 1998.
76 See id.
77 17 U.S.C. §114(d)(2)(C)(v) (2000).
78 17 U.S.C. §114(d)(2)(C)(viii) (2000).
tion 112 as long as they comply with Secction
114's eligibility requirements however, the ex-
emption granted webcasters seems to contradict
the interpretation of the Copyright Office that an
infringement occurs each time a temporary file is
created on the user's hard drive. Thus, the au-
thorization to create a single ephemeral copy pro-
vided by Section 112 does not seem to remedy the
infringement situation created by the streaming
devices.
E. The Copyright Office's December 11, 2000
Rulemaking
On March 16, 2000, the Office issued a Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking ("NPRM") and re-
quested comments from interested parties on
whether a radio signal that originated from a
traditional radio and streamed through the In-
ternet was exempt under Section 114(d) (1) (A).85
On December 11, 2000, the Office issued its final
ruling:
amending its regulatory definition of a 'Service' for
purposes of the statutory license governing the public
performance of sound recordings by means of digital
audio transmissions in order to clarify that transmis-
sions of a broadcast signal over a digital communica-
tions network, such as the Internet, are not exempt
from copyright liability under Section 114(d) (1) (A) of
the Copyright Act.86
Thus, the Copyright Office amended its regula-
tory definition of "service" to clarify that transmis-
sions of a broadcast signal over the Internet are
79) 17 U.S.C. §114(f)(1)(A) (2000). The DPRA provided
that within thirty days of enactment, certain nonexempt
transmissions would initiate voluntary licensing negotiations
with copyright owners. If parties did not reach an agreement,
the DPRA directed the Library of Congress to convene a cop-
yright arbitration royalty panel to determine and publish a
schedule of rates. Id. at §114(f)(B).
80 17 U.S.C. at §114(f) (1) (B) (2000).
81 17 U.S.C. §112 (2000).
82 Id. at §112(a)(1)(B). Under this subsection, an FCC-
licensed radio or television station can make one copy of a
musical performance if "the copy or phonorecord is used
solely for the transmitting organization's own transmissions
within its local service area." Id.
83 Public Performance of Sound Recordings, 65 Fed.
Reg. at 77,300 (citing Broadcasters II Reply Comments at 26)
"[Broadcasters] contend they are eligible to make an ephem-
eral recording under Section 112 (a) because the 'local ser-
vice area' for a transmission over the Internet is global in
scope.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 77,292.
86 Id.
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not exempt from copyright liability under Section
114(d)(1) (A)." 8 7 Thus, the ruling put an end to
the uncertainty surrounding the status of FCC-li-
censed radios stations that stream their own sig-
nals over the Internet.
The outcome of the ruling was important be-
cause the Office needed to decide whether AM/
FM radio stations would be subject to licensing.88
If subject to compulsory licensing, the Office
wanted to ensure that radio stations participated
in the rate negotiations and the determination of
license fees through the CARP proceedings.89 De-
spite the Office's ruling, broadcasters maintained
that FCC-licensed radio broadcasts fall under the
Section 114(d) (1) (A) exemption for "nonsub-
scription broadcast transmission." Consequently,
many broadcasters refused to participate in rate
negotiations.90
IV. JUDICIAL DETERMINATIONS: NAB v.
RIAA AND BONNEVILLE v. REGISTER OF
COPYRIGHTS
A. NAB, RIAA and the FCC-Licensed
Broadcasters
On March 27, 2000, the NAB filed an action in
the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York seeking a declaratory judg-
ment that radio broadcasts over the Internet are
exempt from license fees.9 1 The NAB also re-
quested a stay of the Copyright Office's rulemak-
ing process, pending the outcome of the lawsuit.9 2
The court denied the NAB's motion and allowed
87 Id.
88 Id. at 77,292-77,293.
89 Bonneville Int'l Corp., 153 F. Supp. 2d at 772 (opining,
"If these parties are not covered by the exemption . . . they
should be afforded the opportunity to participate in the
CARP proceeding").
90 Id.
91 National Association of Broadcasters v. Recording In-
dustry Association of America, No. 00 Civ. 2330 (S.D.N.Y,
filed March 27, 2000). The NAB filed this action in March
and parties submitted briefs and reply briefs. However, the
NAB later voluntarily dismissed the case.
92 Public Performance of Sound Recordings, 65 Fed.
Reg. at 77,293 (citing NAB motion to suspend the rulemak-
ing proceeding of the Copyright Office pending the outcome
of NAB v. RIAA).
93 Id. (denying NAB's motion to suspend the rulemak-
ing).
94 Bonneville Int'l Corp., 153 F. Supp. 2d at 765.
95 See id. (noting that, "However, the Broadcasters sug-
gest that the Office may be without authority to interpret the
the Office to proceed with the rulemaking.9 3 Sub-
sequently, the NAB voluntarily dismissed the law-
suit.
After the Office issued its final ruling, a group
of radio station operators, including Bonneville,
and the NAB, filed an action in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania seeking judicial review of the Office's rul-
ing. In Bonneville, the plaintiffs challenged the au-
thority of the Office to interpret Section 114
where Congress had chosen to remain silent.94
The plaintiffs argued that since AM/FM radio sta-
tions are exempt from both compulsory and vol-
untary copyright licensing, their broadcasts fall
outside of Section 114's scope and, therefore, the
Office lacks the statutory authority to decide the
extent of their exemption.9 5
The Office relied on Section 70296 of the Copy-
right Code for its rulemaking authority to "inter-
pret the statute in accordance" with congressional
intent and to provide a statutory interpretation
where Congress had remained silent.9 7 On August
1, 2001, the Bonneville court decided in favor of
the Office.
B. Opinion of the Court: The Rulemaking
Authority of the Copyright Office
Plaintiffs in Bonneville sought judicial review of
the Office's December, 2000 ruling that AM/FM
radio stations broadcasting simultaneously
through the Internet are not exempt from copy-
right liability under Section 114 (d) (1) (A).98 The
first issue the court considered was whether the
extent of the section 114(d) (1) (A) exemption"). Id. ("Plain-
tiffs argue that the Copyright Office lacks the power to deter-
mine whether AM/FM streamers are exempt from the sec-
tion 106 public performance right by section 114(d) (1) (A)
because Congress opted not to vest the agency with that au-
thority.").
96 17 U.S.C. §702 (2000).
97 Bonneville Int'l Corp., 153 F. Supp. 2d at 771 (citing De
Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 577-78 (1956)). In De Sylva
the Supreme Court "acknowledged" that it would "give
weight to the interpretation of an ambiguous statute by [the
Copyright Office,] the agency charged with its administra-
tion." The court in Bonneville adopted the District of Colum-
bia Circuits understanding of De Sylva that the Court would
"defer to the Copyright Office when the latter actually inter-
preted the statute." However, the Court in De Sylva did not
focus on the validity of an Agency rulemaking, but rather on
whether the it would "give weight" to an Agency interpreta-
tion.
98 Public Performance of Sound Recordings, 65 Fed.
Reg. at 77,293.
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Copyright Office had the authority to determine
whether AM/FM radio stations are exempt under
Section 114.99 Relying on case law and legislative
history, the court ruled that Congress intended to
vest the Office with the authority to interpret the
copyright law according to Section 701(b) (2) of
the Copyright Act.' 00 The court relied on Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. National Defense Council, Inc. 01 to
conclude that the Copyright Office's determina-
tion is entitled to judicial deference0 2 because it
is a reasonable interpretation of Section 114.113
The plaintiffs argued that, in light of the Office's
bias in favor of the recording industry and the
RJAA, the defendant is not entitled to Chevron def-
erence.104 The court further relied on Cablevision
System Development Company v. Motion Picture Associ-
ation of America Inc., 0 5 where the court ruled that
Congress intended that the Office serve as an ad-
ministrative "overseer" for the licensing process.
In Cablevision, the court held that the Copyright
Office was empowered to oversee the licensing
process when Congress charged the Office with
the task of convening the CARPs to determine a
statutory license fee in cases where broadcasters
and the RIAA failed to reach an agreement after
direct negotiations. 0 - The Office's oversight au-
thority merely entails delegating to CARPs the
99 Id. at 77,292 (believing that "until the Office rules, the
parties will not agree on who qualifies for the Section 114
performance license," RIAA petitioned the Office to rule on
the issue of whether AM/FM radio stations streaming their
signal over the Internet are exempt from license fees.).
100 See Bonneville Int'l Corp., 153 F. Supp. 2d at 773 (citing
F.D.A v. Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120,
159 (2000)); see also F.D.A. v. Brown and Williamson Tobacco
Corp. at 159. "In extraordinary cases... there may be reason
to hesitate before concluding that Congress has intended...
an implicit delegation." But see Bonneville Int'l Corp. at 773.
The court in Bonneville concluded that this was not an ex-
traordinary situation and that Congress had implicitly vested
the Office with authority to interpret Section 114.
101 467 U.S. 837, 84243 (1984).
102 See Bonneville Int'l Corp., 153 F. Stipp. 2d at 773. The
Bonneville court discussed Chevron's two-prong test to deter-
mine whether an agency action is entitled to judicial defer-
ence. Under the Chevron test, the court must first determine
whether "Congress has directly addressed the precise issue
before it." If not, the second prong of the test directs the
court to inquire "whether the agency's answer is a reasonable
one based on a permissible construction of the statute."
103 Bonneville Int'l Corp., 153 F. Supp. 2d at 773.
104 Id. at 774. (discussing plaintiffs' position that the
Copyright Office is not entitled to a Chevron deference be-
cause of its bias to the recording industry).
105 836 F.2d 599 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
106 Bonneville Int'l Corp., 153 F. Supp. 2d at 772. (relying
on the designation of the Copyright Office as the agency in
task of determining licensing rates for those web-
casters that are subject to statutory licensing.10 7
However, the court failed to clarify how the Of-
fice's authority to determine the statutory rate for
eligible transmissions includes an authority to de-
termine the scope of Section 114 and whether si-
multaneous transmissions of FCC-licensed radio
broadcasts are subject to compulsory licensing.108
Having determined that the Copyright Office
was empowered by Congress to interpret Section
114, the court next considered whether the Of-
fice's interpretation of Section 114 was reasona-
ble.'0 9 According to the court, under Section
114(d) (1) (A), "nonsubscription broadcast trans-
missions" are exempt from Section 106(6) license
fees.' ° However, the difficulty arises when one
looks at the definition of "broadcast" as "a trans-
mission made by a terrestrial broadcast sta-
tion."'" In its comments to the Office, in re-
sponse to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
the RLAA argued that the exemption is limited to
broadcasts transmitted through a terrestrial an-
tenna and does not extend to broadcasts that are
digitally streamed through the Internet.' 12
The court also pointed out that Congress ex-
plicitly subjected webcasters to statutory license
fees under Section 114(d)(2), ' 3 and that, since
charge of the CARP proceedings in concluding that Con-
gress recognized the Office's expertise in this area).
"17 Id. ("[T]he Copyright Office would need the author-
ity to determine which entities and means of transmission
were exempted under the Copyright Act.").
108 Id. at 776 (finding the language of Section 1140) (2)
to be facially ambiguous). The court interpreted the phrase
"licensed as such by the FCC" to mean that the broadcast sta-
tions can only engage in activities licensed by the FCC in or-
der to qualify for the Section 114(d)(1)(A) exemption. The
court concludes that because "streaming" is not an activity
licensed by the FCC, broadcasters engaged in streaming can-
not rely on Section 114(d) (1) (A) to claim an exception from
licensing fees. Id.
109 Bonneville Int'l Corp., 153 F. Supp. 2d at 779 (com-
menting, "I find that the agency's Rulemaking is notjust rea-
sonable, but that it reaches the same conclusion as I would in
the absence of Chevron deference to the Copyright Office.").
110 17 U.S.C. §106(6) (2000).
11 17 U.S.C. §1140) (2) (2000).
112 Joint Comments of the Recording Industry Associa-
tion of America, Inc., Association For Independent Music,
American Federation of Musicians and American Federation
of Television and Radio Artists at 24-25, Public Performance
of Sound Recordings, 65 Fed. Reg. 77,292 (Dec. 11, 2000)
(No. RM 2000-3).
113' 17 U.S.C. §114(d)(2) (2000). Section 114 subjects
three categories of transmissions to statutory licensing: 1)
subscription digital audio transmissions; 2) eligible nonsub-
scription transmissions; and 3) nonsubscription transmis-
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webcasting involves the same technology that is
used by AM/FM broadcasters who simultaneously
stream their signal through the Internet, the Of-
fice's determination is consistent with Congres-
sional intent insofar as streamed broadcasts are
concerned. 114 The court thus relied on the lan-
guage of Section 114(j)(3), which defines a
broadcast transmission as a transmission "made by
a terrestrial broadcast station licensed as such by
the Federal Communications Commission." Ac-
cording to the court's interpretation, "licensed as
such" means that broadcasters cannot engage in
an activity that the FCC does not regulate,
namely, streaming.' 15 However, the fact that the
FCC does not regulate streaming should not be
determinative on the issue of whether streamed
broadcasts are exempt from the copyright public
liability created under Section 106(6).116
The Office argued that in addition to the in-
consistencies created by the plaintiffs' reading of
the statute with the terms of their FCC licenses,
the exemption would conflict with other provi-
sions of Section 114, including the limitation of
broadcast retransmissions to their FCC licensed
150-mile radius.' 17 Therefore, the court con-
cluded that given the language of Section 114 and
Congress' concern over all forms of digitally trans-
mitted music that reach people through the In-
ternet, the most reasonable interpretation of Sec-
tion 114 is that Congress did not intend to ex-
empt AM/FM radio stations that simultaneously
stream their broadcasts through the Internet
from Section 106(6) liability.
sions made by a preexisting satellite digital audio radio ser-
vice. This section explicitly excludes transmissions that are
part of an interactive service; however, it does not specify
whether the process of transmission should involve stream-
ing. Id.
114 Bonneville Int'l Corp., 153 F. Supp. 2d at 779, n.18
(noting that while the court refers to the process at issue as
streaming, "the Copyright Office refers to the same activity as
'AM/FM webcasting' and that "[t]he terms are interchangea-
ble in this opinion").
115 17 U.S.C. §114(j) (3) (2000).
116 Bonneville Int'l Corp., 153 F. Supp. 2d at 771 (inter-
preting the exemption under Section 114(d) (1) (A) as lim-
ited to "over-the-air transmissions by FCC-licensed broadcast-
ers").
117 17 U.S.C. §114(d)(1)(B)(i) (2000); see also Bonneville
Int'l Corp., 153 F. Supp. 2d at 776 (discussing plaintiffs' argu-
ment that this particular limitation applies to third party re-
transmission only and not to simultaneous transmissions by
the originator. of the broadcast signal).
C. Analysis of the Case
The recording industry perceives the techno-
logical advances that have given consumers access
to digital quality music at a click of a button as a
threat to their industry. It is also apparent from
the legislative histories of both the DPRA and the
DMCA that the main goal of the recent wave of
legislation has been to protect record companies
against illegal reproduction and digital transmis-
sion of copyrighted music. 118 However, the court
fails to distinguish between the activities of web-
based radios on the one hand and the FCC-li-
censed broadcasters on the other. Web-based ra-
dio stations or webcasters are not licensed by the
FCC and operate without paying any licensing
fees. 119 These entities can benefit from a compul-
sory license scheme since such a scheme would al-
low them to avoid lengthy licensing fee negotia-
tions with record companies by paying an annual
statutory license fee directly to the RIAA.1 20 FCC-
licensed AM/FM radio stations, on the other
hand, differ from both web-based radio stations
and interactive services in that they stream their
own broadcast signals over the Internet. 12 1 Moreo-
ver, the radio stations' original broadcast signals
are transmitted according to the terms of their
FCC licenses. These transmissions are not subject
to manipulation by end-users, and as transmitting
entities, such broadcasters are not liable to record
companies for public performances of copy-
righted sound recordings.1 22 The Office argues,
however, that the Section 114 exemption was only
118 See Public Performance of Sound Recordings, 65 Fed.
Reg. at 77,295 (explaining that Congress passed the DPRA to
prevent the use of digital technology to facilitate the illegal
duplication and transmission of copyrighted recordings).
119 See Sarah H. McWane, Hollywood vs. Silicon Valley:
DeCSS Down, Napster to Go?, 9 CoMMLAw CONSPECTUS 87-88
(2001) (opining that, "The ease with which Internet users
can copy and download digital files has put both the Motion
Picture Association of America [MPAA] and the [RIAA] at
risk of potentially losing billions of dollars to hackers and pi-
rates over the distribution of digital content").
120 See Phelps, supra note 9, at 20 (discussing the benefits
of statutory licensing to webcasters who can negotiate a blan-
ket license fee with RIAA rather than having to enter into
lengthy negotiations with each record company).
121 Public Performance of Sound Recordings, 65 Fed.
Reg. at 77,297 ("Broadcasters argue that the pivotal element
in the definition is the designation of the nature of the entity
making the transmission, not the method of transmission").
122 17 U.S.C. §§l4(d)(1)(B)(i)-(iii) (2000).
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intended for local transmissions of "over-the-air"
broadcasts. 123
The Office's argument ignores the legislative
history of the DPRA. The 1995 Senate Report ac-
companying the enactment of DPRA emphasized
the need to preserve the traditional relationship
between radio stations and recording compa-
nies. 1 24 Traditionally, radio stations were not sub-
ject to performance right licensing fees. This was
primarily because there was no sound recording
liability when radio stations started broadcasting
and also because record companies considered ra-
dio stations as beneficial to record sales and did
not view them as competitors. 125 It appears that
the recording industry has now discovered the un-
tapped revenue potential of collecting additional
licensing fees from radio stations that stream their
signals through the Internet.' 26
V. THE FUTURE OF BROADCASTERS
UNDER THE NEW LAW
A. Historical Anomaly
Copyright law distinguishes between public and
private performances. The Copyright Act defines
"sound recording" as the result of the fixation of
sounds, such as musical sounds, on a tangible me-
dium such as a tape or compact disc. 12 7 A "public
performance" is defined as a performance outside
123 Bonneville Int'l Corp., 153 F. Supp. 2d at 781.
124 S. REP. NO. 104-128, at 15 (1995) ("This legislation
should do nothing to change or jeopardize the mutually ben-
eficial economic relationship between the recording and
traditional broadcasting industries.").
125 See Wittenstein & Ford, supra note 4 (referring to the
legislative history of the Copyright Act of 1976). In the broad-
casters' view, "record companies are more than adequately
compensated for the use of their music by receiving free ad-
vertising." Id.
126 See Phelps, supra note 9, at 21.
127 17 U.S.C. §101 (2000) (defining sound recordings as
"works that result from the fixation of a series of musical, spo-
ken, or other sounds, but not including the sounds accompa-
nying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, regardless
of the nature of the material objects, such as disks, tapes, or
other phonorecords, in which they are embodied"). Section
101 further defines fixation as embodiment in a "tangible
medium" of some sort. Id.; see also Abrahamson, supra note 3,
at 192 (discussing the evolution of the copyright protection
law from the White-Smith "readability" or "direct perception"
standard to the "tangibility" standard of the 1976 Copyright
Act).
128 17 U.S.C. §101 (2000):
To perform or display a work 'publicly' means -
(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the pub-
of the normal circle of family and friends, such as
a concert. 2 Similarly, the broadcasting of a
sound recording on the radio is considered a pub-
lic performance.129 Thus, streaming on the In-
ternet is considered public performance; how-
ever, the reception of sounds on the user's com-
puter may be considered a private use since the
sound file is received by the addressee only.130
The recording industry asserts that an anomaly
has long existed in copyright law which has per-
sistently denied exclusive public performance
rights to the producers of sound recordings. 131
The Copyright Office and the RLAA believe that
the DPRA and the DMCA were enacted for two
purposes: (1) to correct this historical anomaly
and (2) to protect record companies from unau-
thorized copying of sound recordings made possi-
ble by advances in new technology.' 32 Thus, the
recording industry believes that, in order to re-
main viable, it must subject all streamed music to
copyright liability for sound recordings, including
those by FCC-licensed radio stations. The record-
ing industry argues that failing to do so would cre-
ate an unfair advantage for radio stations over
webcasters.
B. Webcasters v. Broadcasters
The DMCA contains provisions addressing web-
caster's activities. 133 These provisions are outlined
lic or at any place where a substantial number of persons
outside of a normal circle of a family and its social ac-
quaintances is gathered; or
(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a perform-
ance or display of the work to a place specified by clause
(1) or to the public, by means of any device or process,
whether the members of the public capable of receiving
the performance or display receive it in the same place
or in separate places and at the same time or at different
times.
Section 101 further defines transmission as communication
"by any device or process whereby images or sounds are re-
ceived beyond the place from which they are sent." Id.
129 LEAFFER, supra note 29, at 321.
13 0 See Haun, supra note 20, at 51.
131 See Hatch, supra note 54, at S10898 (discussing the
disparity of treatment between the rights of the composers
and publishers, on the one hand, and the rights of producers
of sound recordings, on the other).
132 Id. (discussing the availability of sound recordings to
a vast audience not only through piracy and illegal duplica-
tion of tapes and records, but also through instant digital
transmission by audio-on-demand services).
133 17 U.S.C. §114 (2000); see also §114(d) (2) (detailing
Section 403 of the DMCA list of programming restrictions
intended specifically for webcasters).
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in Section 103 of the DMCA and appear in Chap-
ter 12 of Title 17 of the U.S. Code. Section 1201
of the Copyright Act implements a new obligation
to provide effective protection against circum-
venting the technological measures that webcas-
ters are required to implement in order to qualify
for a statutory license.1 3 4
The Bonneville court did not distinguish be-
tween webcasters and FCC-licensed radio stations
that simultaneously stream their signals over the
Internet.135 Although both groups use the same
technology, FCC-licensed broadcasters stream
their original signal over the Internet, whereas
webcasters are Internet-based entities which de-
sign their programs either for direct streaming or
retransmission of third party radio broadcasts
through their web sites. Of these two groups, only
the FCC-licensed broadcasters that simultaneously
stream their signals through the Internet are af-
fected by the Copyright Office's Ruling.
Broadcasters also differ from webcasters in
other respects. First, broadcasters usually re-
present single channels and are regulated by the
FCC. Thus, they have structured their program-
ming formats and business models in compliance
with the terms of their respective licenses. Web-
casters, on the other hand, offer multi-channel
programming and are not regulated by the
FCC. 136 In addition, broadcasters have public ser-
vice obligations toward the communities they
serve, which webcasters do not. Finally, radio sta-
tions have always had harmonious relationships
with the recording industry and have greatly
aided in the promotion and sales of records. For
these reasons, Congress could not have intended
to burden broadcasters with complicated playlist
134 17 U.S.C. §1201 (2000).
135 Bonneville Int'l Corp., 153 F. Supp. 2d at 776 (rejecting
the argument that Congress intended to subject retransmis-
sions by third parties to copyright liability and exempt origi-
nal transmissions by FCC-licensed AM/FM radios).
136 DIGMEDIA.ORG, WHAT IS DIMA?, Digmedia.org, at
http://www.digmedia.org/about/faq.html (last visited Nov.
9, 2001) ("DIMA... represents its members in negotiations
and discussions with similar representative organizations, e.g.,
RIAA, ASCAP, BMI, Harry Fox Agency, and the National As-
sociation of Broadcasters"); Webcasters are represented by
their trade association, the Digital Media Association. Id.
137 See Ronald Gertz, Radio to Pay for Internet Streaming,
640 PRAc. L. INST. PAT. COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS & LITERARY
PROP. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 63, 66 (2001) (discussing
the contradictory goals of the recording industry, which
seeks to increase musical exposure via terrestrial radio sta-
tions while simultaneously suing to enjoin streaming over the
restrictions and hefty licensing expenses when it
enacted the DMCA. 13 7
C. What Are the Options Available to
Broadcasters?
Broadcasters and the NAB appealed the Bonne-
ville decision. Some broadcasters have already ap-
plied for a compulsory license and are participat-
ing in CARP proceedings. The options available
to the remaining FCC-licensed radio stations are:
(1) to negotiate an exclusive license fee with each
record company; (2) to apply for a compulsory li-
cense and pay a set fee to the RIAA; or (3) to
cease broadcasting through the Internet if the
cost becomes too prohibitive. Yet another option
would be to broadcast through third party webcas-
ters that have already negotiated a license fee with
the RIAA. 138 The webcasters who are currently
participating in CARP proceedings hope to nego-
tiate different rates, depending on both the
amount of musical programming they offer and
whether the music is downloadable by the end-
user.139
Congress did not intend to force broadcasters
into making significant programming changes
which would alter their business planning and
burden them with additional expenses.' 40 The
legislative history of the DPRA makes it clear that
the exclusive right in public performance of
sound recordings should not change copyright
law as to traditional broadcasters.' 4 1 In order to
be eligible to stream their signals through the In-
ternet, however, broadcasters will be forced to
change the format of their programming in com-
pliance with the requirements of the DMCA. This
Internet and use of unrestricted playlists).
138 See Wittenstein & Ford, supra note 42, at 8 (comment-
ing, "If, by contrast, a radio station merely enters into a li-
censing agreement allowing a third party webcaster to stream
the signal, the webcaster (rather than the radio broadcaster)
would be required to obtain the license").
139 Bonneville Int'l Corp., 153 F. Supp. 2d at 767 (discuss-
ing the DRPA's proposed "three-tiered system for catego-
rizing digital transmissions based on their likelihood to affect
record sales").
140 Hatch, supra note 54, at S10899 (ensuring that "this
bill does not have unintended consequences for other copy-
right owners, be they songwriters, music publishers, broad-
casters, or others").
141 139 CONG. REC. S10897, S10900 (daily ed. Aug. 6,
1993) (statement of Sen. Feinstein) ("So-called analog trans-
missions by broadcasters - even of CD's - categorically will
not be affected by this bill.").
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in turn would require major changes in the radio
stations' business strategies at excessive costs to
broadcasters in operational expenses and licens-
ing fees. Webcasters, on the other hand, are rela-
tive newcomers and can adapt their business plans
to conform to the formatting and technological
requirements of the DMCA.
VI. CONCLUSION
Should broadcasters lose their appeal, they
must choose one of the above options. To negoti-
ate voluntary license fees with individual record
companies would result in lengthy negotiations
and would be very costly. Compliance with the
DMCA provisions would result in major changes
in programming and business planning. Finally, if
broadcasters stopped streaming altogether, they
would forgo the opportunity to join the new digi-
tal revolution.
Considering the legislative history of the DPRA
and the DMCA, it seems improbable that Con-
gress intended to bring such sweeping changes to
the broadcasting industry and to subject it to the
impractical conditions of statutory licensing. This
would mean that Congress intended to effectively
end the presence of FCC-licensed radio stations
on the Internet, which is unlikely under even the
broadest reading of the relevant legislative his-
tory.
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